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Adam Smith on money, mercantilism
and the system of natural liberty
RYAN PATRICK HANLEY and MARIA PIA PAGANELLI
On first glance, the study of Adam Smith’s understanding of money
would seem to be an unrewarding pursuit. In an early draft of The Wealth
of nations, Smith himself insisted that with regard to the nature, origin
and history of money, he had ‘little to say that is very new or particular’.1
Yet modern readers should take care not to be misled by Smith’s
modesty. For while Smith’s understanding of money is indeed derivative
of several previous accounts, it plays a crucial role in his development of
one of the conclusions for which he is most famous today: the superiority
of the system of natural liberty tomercantilism. In what follows, we argue
that Smith’s theory of money is a central component of his argument
staking out this claim.
We start with an exposition of different ways in which social order was
conceived in the eighteenth century as a way of setting in context Smith’s
preference for a social order predicated on natural liberty. We then
suggest that his theory of the origins and evolution of money is intended
to illustrate the superiority of this natural order to institutions which
infringe upon natural liberty. By examining his critique of three proto-
monetary policies of his day, we present Smith’s understanding of how
intervention in themonetary order damages society. We then turn to the
role of his theory of money in his critique of one particular proto-
monetary policy, mercantilism, which Smith himself regarded as an
illustration of the dangers of intervention. Here we argue that his
demystification of the mercantilist monetary fallacy was intended as
further support of his argument for the superior beauty and order of the
system of natural liberty. We end with an examination of the role of the
‘science of the legislator’ in promoting the realisation of this system.
Based on this analysis we conclude that despite the seeming unoriginality
of Smith’s conception of money, his analysis lies at the heart of the
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1. AdamSmith, ‘Early draft of part of TheWealth of nations’, in Lectures on jurisprudence, ed. R. L.
Meek, D. D. Raphael and P. G. Stein (1978; Indianapolis, IN, 1982), p.575. See David
Laidler, ‘Adam Smith as a monetary economist’, Canadian journal of economics 14:2 (1981),
p.186; and Douglas Vickers, ‘Adam Smith and the status of the theory of money’, in Essays
on Adam Smith, ed. Andrew S. Skinner and Thomas Wilson (Oxford, 1975), p.483-84, 503.
fundamental project of The Wealth of nations: the demonstration of the
advantages of a system of natural liberty over the artificial order estab-
lished by the mercantilist system of eighteenth-century Britain.
Theories of order and Smith’s theory of money
A brief review of the fundamental categories of the eighteenth-century
debate over man’s capacity to create social order will help establish a
context for understanding Smith’s preference for a natural system of
liberty, as exemplified in his theory of the nature and origins of money.2
Enlightenment deliberations over the nature and development of social
cohesion took different forms. Jonathan Israel remarks on the genealogy
of an ‘unprecedented intellectual turmoil which commenced in the mid-
seventeenth century, with the rise of Cartesianism and the subsequent
spread of ‘‘mechanical philosophy’’ or the ‘‘mechanistic world-view’’ ’,
which fed into the onset of the Enlightenment.3 Brian Singer has
described the conception of social order associated with mechanistic
philosophy as challenging the notion of something ‘given from without
by a divine Other, as subjected to a sphere of transcendence that alone
provides it with its form, finality and meaning’. On this account, ‘The
social order is given to be accepted on faith. The divinity appears at the
origin of society, and His presence is manifested in the continued,
orderly existence of that society.’4
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2. The literature on this topic is of course extensive. On eighteenth-century ideas of social
cohesion, see, among others, Carl L. Becker, The Heavenly city of the eighteenth-century
philosophers (1932; New Haven, CT, 1974); Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment
(1951; Princeton, NJ, 1979); Roger Chartier, The Cultural origins of the French Revolution,
trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Durham, NC, 1991); Chiara Continisio, ‘La ‘‘politica’’
aristotelica: un modello per la convivenza ordinata nella trattatistica politica italiana
dell’Antico Regime’, Cheiron 11:22 (1994), p.149-65; Joachim Fest, Der zerstorte Traum: vom
Ende des utopischen Zeitalters (Berlin, 1991); Michel Foucault, The Order of things: an archeology
of the human sciences (1970; New York, 1994); Daniel Gordon, Citizens without sovereignty:
equality and sociability in French thought, 1670-1789 (Princeton, NJ, 1994); Jonathan I. Israel,
Radical Enlightenment: philosophy and the making of modernity, 1650-1750 (Oxford, 2001);
Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great chain of being (1936; Cambridge, MA, 1982); Robert Nisbet,
History of the idea of progress (New York, 1980); Roy Porter, The Creation of the modern world: the
British Enlightenment (New York, 2000); Brian C. J. Singer, Society, theory and the French
Revolution (New York, 1986); Franco Venturi, The End of the Old Regime in Europe, 1768-1776:
the first crisis, trans. R. Burr Litchfield (Princeton, NJ, 1989); Franco Venturi, The End of the
Old Regime in Europe, 1776-1789, trans. R. Burr Litchfield, 2 vols (Princeton, NJ, 1991)
(translations of Settecento riformatore, vol.3. La Prima crisi dell’Antico Regime (1768-1776)
[1979]; vol.4, La Caduta dell’Antico Regime (1776-1789), vol.1, I Grandi stati dell’Occidente [1984],
and vol.2, Il Patriottismo repubblicano e gli imperi dell’Est [1984]). On their influence on
economics, see William Oliver Coleman, Rationalism and anti-rationalism in the origins of
economics: the philosophical roots of 18th century economic thought (Aldershot, 1995).
3. Israel, Radical Enlightenment, p.14.
4. Singer, Society, theory and the French Revolution, p.13-14.
An alternative understanding of philosophy introduced a different
account of social order and its origins. This view ‘sought to sweep away
existing structures entirely, rejecting the Creation as traditionally under-
stood in Judeo-Christian civilisation, and the intervention of a provi-
dential God in human affairs’.5 As a result, social order was reconceived
as a human construct, the consequence of rational deliberation. Political
society itself was seen by the contractarians as a reasoned agreement
among human beings to create an ordered system capable of advancing
their collective interests and well-being. One particularly important
consequence of this conception was the conclusion that reason and
creation render men able and morally obliged to improve the society
that they created. Such a position in time served to justify several
philanthropic and utopian projects to combat social ills such as poverty,
unemployment and social inequality.6
Of course this emerging viewofman’s capacity to shape social orderdid
not go unquestioned, but faced a variety of reactions from moderate to
extreme. William Coleman has explored the ‘anti-rationalism’ of the
eighteenth century,7 and most relevant for us is a version of a moderate
‘rationalist’ Enlightenment, in which the world is seen as a system, even if
not, admittedly, the ‘system of hierarchy’ favoured by Cartesian rational-
ists. Rather it is a system of ‘mutual interdependence’.8 The moderate
reaction particularly sought to stake out a middle ground between the
theological understanding of order as divinely ordained and the anti-
theological view that sought todenyanyrole forprovidenceandharmony.
One significant moderate position of importance as a precursor to
Smith’s was taken by Montesquieu. In The Spirit of the laws (1748),
Montesquieu presented morals and laws as man-made rather than
God-given, but neither consciously nor rationally constructed. Society
is therefore a result of human conduct, though it cannot be said to be its
conscious result. Laws are context-specific and emerge from individual
interests, and yet, without a conscious intention, they generate a stable
social order. Bernard Mandeville also made an analogous point before
Smith. In The Fable of the bees,9 Mandeville maintains that from private
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5. Israel, Radical Enlightenment, p.11.
6. See Fest, Der zerstorte Traum.
7. Coleman notes: ‘To anti-rationalists our only source of knowledge is the reports of our
senses (where ‘‘senses’’ include not only the five ‘‘external’’ senses but also our feeling and
appetites). The intellect cannot constitute a fundamental source of knowledge, since the
‘‘mind’s eye’’ can only see what was previously deposited there by the senses’ (Rationalism
and anti-rationalism, p.4).
8. Coleman, Rationalism and anti-rationalism, p.65.
9. Mandeville initially published the poem under the title The Grumbling hive: or, Knaves turn’d
honest in 1705. In 1714 he reprinted the work together with a commentary as The Fable of the
bees: or, Private vices publick benefits; he added further sections in editions of 1723 and 1724.
vices public virtues are achieved, claiming that a functioning and
prosperous social order is not the consequence of a conscious design
but the unintended result of self-interested individual actions.
We share the view that sees Adam Smith andMontesquieu as examples
of moderate ‘anti-rationalism’. Smith’s published works, The Theory of
moral sentiments (TMS)10 and The Wealth of nations (WN), though on seem-
ingly different topics, are both grounded in a common understanding of
society: namely that it may function and thrive without any conscious
human design.11 The Theory of moral sentiments describes how it is not
reason, but our senses, emotions and passions that generate canons of
behaviour that keep society together and promote both individual and
social moral flourishing. The Wealth of nations is an enquiry into the ways
in which our individual interests, emotions and passions, rather than
reason, generate economic phenomena and forces at the macro level
that sustain the economy and facilitate individual and social material
prosperity.
On Smith’s account, the human mind may aspire to understand the
social order, and yet the weakness of human reason is such that even the
limited process of trying to grasp it seems daunting.12 Attempts to
change this order through rational intervention would be unlikely to
bring success. Nevertheless, Smith leaves some space for what he calls the
‘science of a statesman or legislator’ (WN IV.intro.1) to promote the
enrichment of the entire nation.
Consistent with the view that successful social institutions are not the
product of conscious rational design, Smith presents the origin ofmoney
as a natural social occurrence and not as a conscious human creation. It
is on this claim that our analysis of Smith’s theory of money will focus,
rather than aspiring to provide a comprehensive account of his under-
standing of money.13 His fundamental claim in this regard is that money
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10. Smith [1759]; The Theory of moral sentiments, ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (1976;
Indianapolis, IN, 1982). References in the essay to Smith’s works are given parenthetically
to the Glasgow edition as republished by the Liberty Fund according to the standard
paragraphnumbering systemof this edition.WN=An Inquiry into the nature and causes of the
wealth of nations;TMS=The Theory of moral sentiments; LJ=Lectures on Jurisprudence.
11. The question of whether the lack of human design implies a divine design or no design at
all is beyond our scope here. Furthermore, this ambiguity has been widely discussed in the
literature on Smith and still has not reached agreement. For a treatment of this literature,
see Leonidas Montes, Adam Smith in context: a critical reassessment of some central components of
his thought (New York, 2004).
12. For a detailed account of this view, see Coleman, Rationalism and anti-rationalism. For an
account of the difficulties in understanding the physical order, see Eric Schliesser,
‘Wonder in the face of scientific revolutions: Adam Smith on Newton’s ‘‘proof’’ of
Copernicanism’, British journal for the history of philosophy 13:4 (2005), p.697-732.
13. For such accounts, see Jacob H. Hollander, ‘The development of the theory of money
fromAdamSmith to David Ricardo’,Quarterly journal of economics 25:3 (1911), p.433-41; and
is in fact an epiphenomenon of commerce, a social institution that
developed in an attempt to decrease the inconveniences of the double
coincidence of wants and barter. Barter, he explains, is a human pro-
pensity that originally afforded incentives to specialise and to further
trade. Those engaged in trade then needed to find a means of exchange
that ‘few people would be likely to refuse in exchange for the produce of
their industry’ (WN I.iv.2). Precious metals frequently began to be used as
money and, in time, Mints were founded to make easier their weighing
and assaying (WN I.iv.7), and eventually the weight and fineness of these
metals came to be stated on them as well (WN I.iv.9). Thus presented, the
history of money is not the result of the rational design of a particular
individual, but rather of the interactions of a multitude of individuals
over time who collectively developed a mechanism to render simpler
those transactions intended to further the pursuit of their self-interest.
The same forces that generate social, moral and economic order thus
also generate money.
Smith’s critique of proto-monetary policies
Smith’s critical analysis of what might be considered the proto-monetary
policies of his day, like his theory of money itself, is consistent with his
view that social and economic growth is not the product of conscious
design. Thus, his analysis further develops his claim that the order
generated by individuals in the course of pursuing their private interest
generally produces more desirable results than do schemes of particular
individuals to improve the economy or social order.14 He continually
reminds his readers that a market order ought to be preferred to a
constructed order, both in the best and in the worst case scenario of the
latter. The best case would be the situation that would obtain under what
we would call a benevolent dictator. Smith claims that even the most
well-intended legislator cannot outperform the invisible hand of the
market, insisting that natural ordering is a more effective means of
production and distribution than even the most effective scheme that an
omniscient and well-intended ruler might propose. In the worst case
scenario, when social policies are developed by interest groups rather
than those genuinely concerned for the well-being of the society, the
‘public’ policies that result benefit only particular segments of society,
while doing widespread harm to the whole.
This claim is the foundation of Smith’s critique of three specific
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more recently Vickers, ‘Adam Smith and the status of the theory of money’; and Laidler,
‘Adam Smith as monetary economist’.
14. For an account of the strength of these orders, see Maria Pia Paganelli, ‘Adam Smith: why
decentralized systems?’, The Adam Smith review 2 (2006), p.203-208.
eighteenth-century proto-monetary policies. These approaches are not,
strictly speaking, monetary policies as we would consider them today,
since they generally differ in both motivation and implementation from
modern forms. We think in terms of controlling the money supply to
encourage or at least to fine-tune the economy through the actions of a
central bank. But in Smith’s time, attempts to control money supply in
an effort to better the economy were in their infancy and central banks
as we know them today had not yet been created. Nevertheless, efforts
weremade to control the money supply through certain proto-monetary
policies – debasement, paper credit money, and tariffs – and Smith was
critical of all of them.
The first proto-monetary policy considered by Smith is debasement.
Debasement consists in decreasing the amount of metal in a coin while
keeping its denomination constant. We hesitate to call this action ‘policy’
because it was generally meant explicitly to benefit the sovereign, and
not to advance the general interests of society. Smith himself insists that
debasement is not a public policy but a forcible abuse of power for the
sake of personal benefit. It is indeed ‘the avarice and injustice of princes
and sovereign states’ that promotes debasement to help debtors (the
king) and ruin creditors (WN I.iv.10).
The second proto-monetary policy considered by Smith is the use of
paper credit money. Smith recognises the necessity of paper credit
money in the economy. The role of paper in domestic markets as a
substitute for metallic money promotes the freeing of productive re-
sources that would be otherwise unusable. Metals can be employed
abroad while paper money is not accepted far from the place of issuing.
Thus it is ‘by rendering a greater part of that capital active and
productive than would otherwise be so, that the most judicious oper-
ations of banking can increase the industry of the country’ (WN II.ii.86).
Yet paper is not a policy instrument because the ‘judicious operations of
banking’ are not the result of rational planning, but the consequence of
the uncoordinated operations of a multitude of private banks indepen-
dent from and acting in competition with each other. Here again
economic growth is the unintended consequence of a multitude of
individual actions. Furthermore, when Smith has to face the possible
use of credit as a policy instrument, he dismisses it as either a failure or
an absurdity. In 1696, he pointed out, the Bank of England had to been
obliged to suspend payments on its notes (WN II.ii.80), which exemplified
the fact that when a central rational plan for banking is attempted the
socio-economic order falls apart.15 Smith even dismisses John Law’s
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15. Smith refers here to events of 6 May 1696, during the Recoinage, when a run on the Bank
of England forced a partial suspension of cash payments. Two days earlier, clipped coins
paper experiments and his Mississippi Scheme, the most majestic of the
rational schemes at the time. To improve the economy by increasing the
money supply would be a disaster for industry, and Smith dismisses them
as ‘the most extravagant project both of banking and stock-jobbing that,
perhaps, the world ever saw’ (WN II.ii.78).16 As Smith is reported to have
explained in the lecture notes of his students: ‘[Mr Law] thought that
national opulence consists inmoney, and that the value of gold and silver
is arbitrary’. (LJ, p.270) Law’s failure was inevitable because of ‘the vanity
of both these imaginations’.17
The third proto-monetary policy that Smith extensively analysed was
mercantilism, to which he dedicated the whole of WN IV. Among the
central mercantilist tenets was a commitment to increase the quantity of
money in the economy in order to maximise the power of a country (in a
zero-sum conception of economic rivalry).18 The only form of money
that mercantilists regarded as legitimate was precious metals. Paper is a
mere shadow of metals, as it derives its value from representing gold and
silver. To achieve their goal of increasing the quantity of money (that is,
gold and silver), the mercantilists sought to limit imports (payments for
which implied the exiting of gold and silver from the country) and to
incentivise exports (which brought gold and silver into the country in the
form of payments). The results of these policies, Smith argues, are
catastrophic for at least two reasons. First he argues that the entire
mercantile system rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of the
nature and uses of money, namely the misperception that money is
wealth: ‘it would be too ridiculous to go about seriously to prove, that
wealth does not consist in money, or in gold and silver’ (WN IV.i.17). It
follows that using resources to accumulate money not only prevents the
allocation of those same resources to accumulating further wealth, but it
is wasteful because ‘Upon every account...the attention of government
never was so unnecessarily employed, as when directed to watch over the
preservation or increase of the quantity of money in any country’ (WN
IV.i.15). Second, mercantilism is based on special interests, not on
general interest. Pursuing the betterment of one specific group at the
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had ceased to be accepted by law but the Bank had insufficient stores of reminted money
to answer demand. See Sir John Clapham, The Bank of England: a history, vol.1, p.32, 35-36.
16. For a detailed account of Smith and paper credit see Maria Pia Paganelli, ‘Vanity and the
Daedalian wings of paper money in Adam Smith’, in New voices on Adam Smith, ed. Eric
Schliesser and Leonidas Montes (London, 2006), p.271-89. For a critical account of
Smith’s analysis see Athol Fitzgibbons, Adam Smith’s system of liberty, wealth, and virtue: the
moral and political foundations of the Wealth of nations (Oxford, 1995).
17. Smith, ‘Early draft’, in Lectures on jurisprudence, p.42.
18. For a review of the central claims of mercantilism, see Jacob Viner, ‘English theories of
foreign trade before Adam Smith’, Journal of political economy 38:4 (1930), p.249-301; and
Mark Blaug, Economic theory in retrospect, 4th edn (Cambridge, 1985), p.10-18.
expense of the rest of society, Smith argues, necessarily leads to the
impoverishment rather than the enrichment of society as a whole.19 In
illustrating the practical consequences of this aspect of mercantilist
thought, Smith presents his fullest statement of the superior beauty
and order of the system of natural liberty to a rationally constructed
order.20
Mercantilism and money
Smith opensWN IV with a description of the mercantilist conception of
money: ‘That wealth consists in money, or in gold and silver, is a popular
notion which naturally arises from a double function of money, as the
instrument of commerce, and as the measure of value’ (WN IV.i.1).
Examination of this fallacy dominates the entirety of WN IV.i, which
leads him into an eventual apology that he thought it ‘necessary, though
at the hazard of being tedious, to examine at full length this popular
notion’ (WN IV.i.34; see I.iv.18). In both places Smith calls attention to
the fact that mercantilism rests on an unexamined opinion, an ‘ambi-
guity of expression’ in ‘common language’ that mercantilism’s sup-
porters have exploited to gain legislative support for their proposals
(WN IV.i.34).21 Smith’s own strategy in arguing against mercantilism was
to expose this sleight of hand, and thereby encourage his readers to
pursue a more careful enquiry into the true nature of both money and
wealth.22
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19. See, among others, Jerry Evensky, ‘The evolution of Adam Smith’s views on political
economy’, History of political economy 21:1 (1989), p.123-45; Evensky, Adam Smith’s moral
philosophy (Cambridge, 2005).
20. In this sense, Smith’s treatment of the mercantile misunderstanding has philosophical as
well as economic significance, insofar as it is shaped by his understanding of episte-
mology. An important attempt to locate The Wealth of nations within Smith’s wider
philosophical commitments is offered in Samuel Fleischacker, On Adam Smith’s Wealth of
nations: a philosophical companion (Princeton, NJ, 2004), esp. p.21-31, which is particularly
sensitive to Smith’s commitment to the advantages of an epistemology grounded in
‘common sense’ rather than simple scepticism.
21. Smith’s emphasis on the mercantilists’ confusion of money and wealth has been noted by
several commentators; see for example Laidler, ‘Adam Smith as monetary economist’,
p.193; Viner, ‘English theories of foreign trade before Adam Smith’, p.264f; Donald
Winch, Riches and poverty: an intellectual history of political economy in Britain, 1750-1834
(Cambridge, 1996), p.110; Peter McNamara, Political economy and statesmanship: Smith,
Hamilton, and the foundation of the commercial republic (DeKalb, IL, 1998), p.61-62; and
Evensky, Adam Smith’s moral philosophy, p.185. For Smith’s sensitivity to the use and abuse
of rhetoric in political and economic argument, see especially Andrew S. Skinner, ‘Adam
Smith: rhetoric and the communication of ideas’, in Methodological controversy in economics:
historical essays in honour of T. W. Hutchison, ed. A. W. Coats (London, 1983), p.71-88;
Vivienne Brown, Adam Smith’s discourse: canonicity, commerce, conscience (London, 1994);
Charles Griswold, Adam Smith and the virtues of Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1999); and
Fleischacker, On Smith’s Wealth of nations, ch. 1.
22. In discussing The Wealth of nations IV, McNamara writes that ‘Smith’s inquiry is founded
Smith’s attempt to bring his audience from a popular opinion con-
cerning money to a true understanding of it depends on his ability to
demonstrate that money is a matter of convention. In a passage Smith
knew well, Aristotle had insisted that there is a fundamental distinction
between money (nomisma, from nomos, or ‘law’ or ‘custom’) and wealth,
which is tied to a natural capacity or need.23 Smith’s own discussion of
money rests on the same distinction. The problem at the heart of the
mercantile conception of money is that in it ‘two values’ are ‘intimated
somewhat ambiguously by the same word’ – that is, money is taken to
represent both the instrument of exchange and genuine wealth (WN
II.ii.17). Consequently, what is needed is to move beyond the ‘ambiguity
of language’ (TMS VII.ii.4.11)24 – a call repeated in Smith’s insistence in
WN IV that ‘wemust in all cases attend to the nature of the thing, without
paying any regard to the word’ (WN IV.v.a.40).
In reconsidering the mercantile understanding of money, Smith thus
seeks to move his audience beyond the false appearances of mere
conventions, and instead encourages in them an appreciation of what
is natural. The widespread success of the mercantile fallacy derived from
the fact that its reliance on certain conventions appealed to the natural
human propensity to prefer the plain and visible to the obscure and
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upon an attempt to reach beyond the ordinary understanding of things by inventing a
technical language for discussing the subjectmatter of political economy’ (Political economy
and statesmanship, p.63). The view developed below agrees with McNamara’s claim that
Smith sought to move his audience beyond the ‘ordinary understanding’ that the
mercantilists exploited – a claim also made by Fleischacker, On Smith’s Wealth of nations,
p.16-17, who notes that the mercantilists ‘appealed to a popular confusion’, and Evensky,
who argues that on Smith’s account ‘the mercantilists’ sophistry was successful because
they took advantage of an asymmetry of information’ (Adam Smith’s moral philosophy, p.190).
But our argument below is that Smith’s remedy for this practical problem lay principally
neither in an ‘invention’ nor, on the other hand, in returning to ‘thoughts couched in
common language’ (Fleischacker, On Smith’s Wealth of nations, p.24-5), but rather in seeking
to expand the vision of his readers.
23. See Aristotle, Politics, 1257b5-15; Nicomachean ethics, 1133a25-32; see Smith, WN I.iv.7.
24. Smith frequently notes confusions of words and calls attention to the limitations of
popular understandings of terms (see, for example, TMS VI.iii.33-34; TMS VII.ii.1.10). In
this sense his conception of speech parallels his treatment of money. Speech and
commerce are both natural systems of exchange employing instruments of conventional
value as a means – money in the case of commerce, and words in the case of speech – and
in both cases the conventional instruments of each system are prone to misunderstand-
ing. See especially Andreas Kalyvas and Ira Katznelson, ‘The rhetoric of themarket: Adam
Smith on recognition, speech and exchange’, Review of politics 63:3 (2001), p.568f; Charles
Bazerman, ‘Money talks: the rhetorical project of the Wealth of nations’, in Economics and
language, ed. Willie Henderson, Tony Dudley-Evans and Roger Backhouse (London, 1993),
p.189, 194-95; and James Otteson, Adam Smith’s marketplace of life (Cambridge, 2002), p.258-
89. Especially helpful in elucidating this comparison is Otteson’s analysis of how an
‘unintended order’ is discernible in the development of language (see p.270, 274).
abstract (see for example LJ vi.13). Money, like other visible objects, is
trusted for its physical appearance. Smith admits that it is ‘more natural’
for ‘the greater part of people’ to make judgments on the basis of ‘a plain
palpable object’, as opposed to an ‘abstract notion, which, though it can
be made sufficiently intelligible, is not altogether so natural and obvious’
(WN I.v.5). Indeed for a butcher, brewer or baker, ‘It is more natural and
obvious’ to estimate the value of a product ‘by the quantity of money, the
commodity for which he immediately exchanges them, than by that of
bread and beer’, and for this reason ‘the exchangeable value of every
commodity is more frequently estimated by the quantity of money, than
by the quantity either of labour or of any other commodity which can be
had in exchange for it’ (WN I.v.6). This preference for the palpable is
what explains the attractions of the mercantile fallacy, as it seems natural
to ordinary people to trust tangible, seemingly ‘lasting’ gold to ‘perish-
able’ or ‘consumable’ commodities whose value appears unreliable (WN
IV.i.19).25
Thus, Smith concludes, in ordinary economic transactions, ‘we gen-
erally look no farther than money’ (LJ vi.146). Yet sight, Smith knows, is a
double-edged sword. The visible may have the advantage of being readily
apprehended, but this can be a disadvantage if appearances are mistaken
for the whole truth. As Smith seeks to show, if one hopes to understand a
system in its entirety – and particularly the complex system of inter-
national political economy – one must take a broader view that en-
compasses more than that which is readily apparent.26 Thus Smith does
not mean to disabuse ordinary economic agents of their instinctive
understanding of money; the common sense perspective, he notes,
‘though not exact, is sufficient for carrying on the business of common
life’ (WN I.v.4). Rather, his intention is to expose how economic policy-
makers, and the mercantilists in particular, have exploited this instinc-
tive but imprecise understanding, and it is in this spirit that he warns of
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25. In this respect Smith’s treatment of the appearance of money parallels his treatment
elsewhere of the natural reverence that men have for moral appearances, in which he
emphasises that money and wealth are desired less for their intrinsic utility than for the
sake of how they make their possessor appear in the eyes of others (TMS I.iii.2.1; WN
I.xi.c.31). Likewise Smith notes that in moral life we are frequently seduced by the
‘dazzling’ appearance of ornament and beauty, which often leads us to prefer ‘the gaudy
and glittering’ to the solid and substantive (WN IV.vii.b.7; TMS I.iii.3.2), even though all
that glitters is not necessarily good (WN IV.vii.a.17).
26. For an excellent discussion of Smith’s subtle discrimination between the familiar but
limited perspective of common life and the expanded vision of the philosopher, see
Fleischacker,On Smith’sWealth of nations, p.30-31.On the problems of vision in Smithmore
generally and his debt to Bishop Berkeley’s theory of vision see David M. Levy, ‘Bishop
Berkeley exorcises the infinite: fuzzy consequences of strict finitism’, Hume studies 18:2
(1992), p.511-36; and Levy, ‘The partial spectator in the Wealth of nations: a robust
utilitarianism’, European journal of the history of economic thought 2:2 (1995), p.299-326.
the dangers that come from erecting ‘the sneaking arts of underling
tradesmen’ to the level of ‘political maxims for the conduct of a great
empire’ (WN IV.iii.c.8).27 Smith consistently emphasises that to judge on
the basis of appearances is to judge in terms of partial and often
incorrect knowledge. It is precisely this limited judgement, apt to pro-
mote intervention into complex systems, which he calls his audience of
potential economic policymakers to transcend. By gradually bringing
this audience to a more precise understanding of money, beyond that
afforded by the popular understanding embodied in ordinary language,
Smith encourages the development both of an appreciation of the
significance of money beyond what its appearances reveal,28 and, in
turn, an awareness of the intricacy and complexity of the economic
system as a whole. By so doing he hopes to foster an understanding which
will render his readers less inclined to intervene in the economic system.
The science of the legislator
At the same time that Smith exposes the error in the understanding of
money characteristic of mercantilism, he alsomeans to provide a remedy
for it. It is to this remedy that we now turn. Smith summarised the
opposing approach to legislative intervention in his discussion of the
man of system who, ‘wise in his own conceit’, thinks he can manage men
as he can manipulate pieces on a chessboard (see TMS VI.ii.2.17). Lost in
this reductive vision, Smith argues, is the moderation, scepticism and
caution that are fundamental to the art of economic legislation. The
moderate alternative to the approach of the man of system he calls the
‘science of a statesman or legislator’.29 The science of the legislator,
applied to political economy, ‘proposes to enrich both the people and
the sovereign’, and on these grounds alone it can be distinguished from
mercantilism (WN IV.intro.1). Like themen of system, the merchants and
manufacturers who support mercantilism are incapable of accounting
for any interests beyond their own; all of their efforts are dedicated to
advancing their own partial interests, and ‘to know in what manner it
enriched the country, was no part of their business’ (WN IV.i.10). A great
gap in fact separates thesemen from the general interest of the nation, as
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they in their ‘sophistry’ are ‘always demanding a monopoly against their
countrymen’, in their effort to further interests ‘directly opposite to that
of the great body of the people’ (WN IV.ii.38; IV.iii.c.10).30 He explains
that they are ‘an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same
with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and
even oppress the publick, and who accordingly have, upon many oc-
casions, both deceived and oppressed it’ (WN I.xi.p.10). At their worst
they even threaten political stability; hence his likening of them to ‘an
overgrown standing army’ and his claim that ‘they have become formi-
dable to the government, and upon many occasions intimidate the
legislature’ (WN IV.ii.43; see IV.v.a.28). Insofar as they cannot consider
interests beyond those of their own class, the mercantilists fall victim to
the most vulgar sort of partiality that blinds them to the benefits of the
system as a whole.
Smith seeks to counter such selfishness and partiality by encouraging
his audience to cultivate an appreciation of this system in its entirety.
Thus, where the mercantilists imposed on the simplicity of gentlemen in
order to manipulate them (WN I.xi.p.10), Smith seeks to direct their
generous and expansive imaginations to a vision of the beauty and order
of the system as a whole, an appreciation of which he regards as the best
defence against economic intervention. By so doing, he means to en-
courage their decent desire to promote rather than obstruct the im-
provement of the estates of their neighbours – that is to say, their
intuitive anti-mercantilist appreciation of the fact that improvement is
mutual (WN IV.ii.21).31 Smith identifies an antecedent of this process in
his description of how the principle of sympathy enables individuals to
transcend the narrow egotism on whichHobbes andMandeville founded
their systems. Despite our natural preference for ourselves, he here
explains, social order requires that we correct the ‘otherwise natural
inequality of our sentiments’. Thus, he explains,
to the selfish and original passions of human nature, the loss or gain of a very
small interest of our own, appears to be of vastly more importance, excites a
muchmore passionate joy or sorrow, amuchmore ardent desire or aversion,
than the greatest concern of another with whom we have no particular
connexion. His interests, as long as they are surveyed from this station, can
never be put into balance with our own, can never restrain us from doing
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whatever may tend to promote our own, how ruinous soever to him. Before
we can make any proper comparison of those opposite interests we must
change our position. (TMS III.3.3)
Social order requires that we take a wider perspective beyond self-
interest. It is precisely this perspective that he calls his would-be eco-
nomic legislators to take inWN IV, in contrast to the narrow perspective
adopted by mercantilism’s advocates. Put this way, it is clear that Smith’s
appeal to the generosity of his audience is not addressed to their
beneficence. Beneficence is not wholly absent from his anti-mercantil-
ism,32 yet in general his goal is not to encourage the sort of pity that leads
to public activism, but rather the opposite: by revealing to his audience
the intricacy and complexity, and thus the beauty of the system of
international political economy as a whole, Smith hopes to encourage a
reverence for this system and hence a temerity, humility and reticence to
intervene in it – the direct opposite of the aggressive arrogance charac-
teristic of the mercantilists.33
Smith explains this approach in The Theory of moral sentiments. The
improvements that ‘promote the public welfare [do not] always rise from
pure sympathy with the happiness of those who are to reap the benefit of
it’. Rather it is the case that these great systems, when taken as a whole,
are themselves ‘noble and magnificent objects’, and that since ‘We take
pleasure in beholding the perfection of so beautiful and grand a system’,
we ‘are uneasy till we move any obstruction that can in the least disturb
or encumber the regularity of its motions’. This leads him to conclude
that if one hopes to persuade men to support public policies which are
genuinely public-spirited, one should not preach benevolence but rather
one should ‘describe the great system’ that procures public advantages –
‘the connexions and dependencies of its several parts, their mutual
subordination to one another, and their general subserviency to the
happiness of the society’. Most importantly, it is best
if you show how this system might be introduced into his own country, what
it is that hinders it from taking place there at present, how those obstruc-
tions might be removed, and all the several wheels of the machine of
government be made to move with more harmony and smoothness, without
grating upon one another, or mutually retarding one another’s motions. It is
scarce possible that a man should listen to a discourse of this kind, and not
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feel himself animated to some degree of public spirit. He will, at least for the
moment, feel some desire to remove those obstructions, and to put into
motion so beautiful and so orderly a machine. (TMS IV.1.11)
Smith’s own anti-mercantilist argument in WN IV closely follows this
advice.34 By detailing the impediments and artifices of the mercantilists
and their detrimental effects, he provides a blueprint for removing those
obstructions that have impeded the realisation of the beauty and order
of the system of natural liberty.
TheWealth of nations IV indeed traces a process in several stages, each of
which successively expands the horizons of its audience and leads them
from the natural, though partial, perspective of the mercantilists to the
broader, more comprehensive perspective of the genuine legislator. He
begins, as we have seen, by encouraging his audience to see the short-
comings of the common sense understanding of money gleaned from its
appearances. But after having revealed the failings of this ordinary
perspective, he then moves on to the dangers of the nationalistic
perspective, turning from ‘private interest and the spirit of monopoly’
to those risks that arise as the consequence of ‘national prejudice and
animosity’ (WN IV.iii.a.1). Having ascended to this more encompassing
view, Smith goes on to show the shortcomings of the ordinary perspec-
tive when it is manifested at the national level, in which ‘each nation has
been made to look with an invidious eye upon the prosperity of all the
nations with which it trades, and to consider their gain as its own loss.
Commerce, which ought naturally to be, among nations, as among
individuals, a bond of union and friendship, has become the most fertile
source of discord and animosity’ (WN IV.iii.c.9). As Smith hopes to show,
a true understanding of the benefits of unhindered international trade
can be achieved only when the system is regarded from the widest
possible position: not from the perspective of that which is immediately
visible, but from the point of view of ‘the whole globe of the earth’ (WN
IV.iii.c.16).35 Such cosmopolitanism is presented not as the product of
global benevolence, but from Smith’s attempt to put his imaginative
audience in mind of the beauty and natural order of the system of
international political economy. ‘Were all nations to follow the liberal
system of free exportation and free importation, the different states into
which a great continent was divided would so far resemble the different
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provinces of a great empire’ (WN IV.v.b.39). For this reason, Smith
presents the ordered beauty of the ‘liberal system’ as an alternative to
the reductive jealousy, prejudice and ‘national animosity’ that charac-
terises the mercantile system.
In this chapter, we have shown how Smith employs his theory of
money to exemplify the superiority of market orders to rationally
constructed orders. Smith’s account of the history of money demon-
strates that its evolution is the successful result of the undirected inter-
actions ofmany individuals, rather than the fulfilment of one individual’s
rational project. He also shows how government intervention in the
monetary order leads to results inferior to those produced by natural
market forces. Smith’s energetic intellectual commitment to the disman-
tling of mercantilism exemplifies his conviction that constructive orders
would impoverish society, while the wealth of nations would increase
only through the restitution of the system of natural liberty. In his
treatment of money, indeed, Smith seeks to impress on his audience the
beauty of the system of natural liberty so that they will both rescind the
artificial obstacles to natural order created by men and also possess a
degree of humility sufficient to prevent them from thinking that they can
tamper with the system itself.
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